DC-9 Ditches in Atlantic OceanBy Patrick Mondout
On May 2, 1970, a Overseas
National Airways aircraft leased* to Antilliaanse Luchtvaart
Maatschappij (ALM; a.k.a. Antillean Airlines) crashed when it ran out of
fuel near St. Croix, Virgin Islands.
ALM Flight 980 departed Kennedy International Airport in New York on a
nonstop flight for St. Maarten, Netherlands Antilles. After making three
circling approaches in poor weather, the crew decided to land elsewhere
and and the DC-9 headed for St. Croix.
Unfortunately, they no longer had enough fuel for such a journey.
By the time the crew realized their situation it was too late to turn
back; the aircraft descended to the ocean and the DC-9 was ditched once
the fuel was exhausted. Captain Balsey D. DeWitt advised purser Wilford J.
Spencer they were low on fuel, and to prepare the cabin for
ditching.
The purser understood this to be a precautionary measure and assumed
that further instructions would be given if a ditching were necessary.
Steward Tobias Cordeiro and stewardess Margaret Abraham demonstrated how
to put on the lifevest as the purser made the announcement over the cabin
public address (PA) system. (The cockpit microphone for the PA system was
inoperative, and as a result no direct instructions were given from the
cockpit.)
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DC-9 |
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Here is the actual DC-9
which crashed landed in the ocean that day. It is
seen here in Houston in June 1966.
Image courtesy of John Stewart.
Find more of his photos at Airliners.net. |
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All three cabin attendants assisted individual passengers as necessary.
Some passengers could not remove the lifevests from the pouch under the
seat, and others were unable to don the vest properly. Navigator Hugh H.
Hart was sent back to the cabin to assist with preparations for ditching,
and he helped the purser move the 25-person raft from the forward coat
closet, on the left side of the aircraft, to the galley area directly
opposite on the right side.
"Sit Down!"
The steward was also in the galley area securing the galley equipment
when the navigator suddenly was aware that impact was imminent, and
shouted for everyone to sit down. The steward sat down on the raft, facing
aft, and the navigator and purser sat in the aft-facing jumpseat on the
forward cabin bulkhead. They were unable to fasten their seatbelts prior
to impact. Several passengers and the stewardess were still standing, and
at least five others did not have their seatbelts fastened at impact.
The reactions of passengers ranged from those who used pillows in
various "crash positions" to those who looked out the window,
assuming that the aircraft was completing an overwater approach to the
runway at St. Croix.
Following impact, the purser and the navigator attempted to open the
forward main passenger loading door, but found it to be jammed and
inoperable. These two crewmembers then moved to the galley area where a
third crewman, the steward, had already opened the galley exit door and at
least one passenger had made her escape through the galley door. The three
crewmen attempted to free the raft from the galley equipment which had
spilled to the galley floor. They had just been joined by first officer
Harry E. Evans in this effort when the raft inadvertently inflated. The
inflated raft pinned the first officer to the galley bulkhead, and
prevented the other crewmembers from entering the main cabin area. The
first officer did not recall how the liferaft became inflated or how he
became free from the position in which it pinned him. These four
crewmembers exited through the galley door.
The captain was aware of the difficulties in the galley area, and
entered the water through the cockpit window. He swam to the left overwing
exits, opened them from the outside, and assisted two passengers out of
the aircraft. The captain then glanced through the cabin for additional
passengers but saw none. Most of the passengers exited through the aft
right overwing exit, which was opened by a passenger who was seated next
to it. The navigator found an emergency escape slide floating in the water
and, with the help of a female passenger, inflated it.
The first officer, who had no lifevest, climbed on top of the slide and
assumed command of the main group of survivors who gathered around the
slide. Belts and ties were used to provide additional hand-holds for the
people.
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U.S. Coast Guard HU-16
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Courtesy of the US Coast Guard
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The ditching site was confirmed on radar with the assistance of a Pan
American flight that diverted for that purpose. Other fixed-wing
aircraft orbited the area until the U.S. Coast Guard, Navy, and Marine
Corps arrived.
Although none of the five 25-person rafts on board the aircraft was
deployed, several rafts were air-dropped at the ditching site. The U.S.
Coast Guard HU-16, an amphibian aircraft, dropped two rafts but both fell
too far away to be reached. In addition, a Skyvan dropped two rafts in the
area. The captain swam to one raft and the navigator reached the other,
but neither was able to maneuver his raft back to the main group.
Recovery of the survivors by helicopter began approximately ninety
minutes after the ditching, and the last survivor, the first officer, was
picked up about 1 hour later. In summary, 11 survivors were picked up by
the two U.S. Coast Guard HH-52A helicopters, 26 survivors were rescued by
a U.S. Navy SH-3A helicopter, and the remaining three survivors were
picked up by a U.S. Marine Corps CH-46 helicopter.
Twenty-three persons, including two infants and stewardess Margaret
Abraham, did not survive.
Investigation
Every flight carries extra fuel in case it needs to be diverted to an
alternate airport. The crew was not made aware of the prevalent visual
conditions prior to arriving and spent too much time attempting to land
before diverting, making a successful landing at their alternate
impossible.
The NTSB believed more would have survived had their been better crew
coordination before the ditching the aircraft (which sank to about 5,000
feet and was not recovered).
NTSB Recommendations
The Board recommended that actions be taken to improve passenger safety
through adequate warning, proper briefing, standardized seatbelts, and
more accessible stowage of lifevests for emergencies. It also recommended
priority action in the establishment of a VHF communications link between
San Juan and St. Maarten. Lastly, it recommended that the FAA reassess the
standards pertaining to certification of flotation equipment used aboard
aircraft.
*Lease called for an ONA aircraft and flightcrew,
and an ALM cabin crew.
Source: Adapted from National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) report NTSB-AAR-71-8, adopted March 31, 1971.
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