Apollo 13By NASA*
This was to be the third lunar landing mission. The mission was aborted
after rupture of service module oxygen tank. It was classed by NASA as
"successful failure" because of the rescuing of the crew.
Measles
Days before the mission, backup Lunar Module (LM) pilot Charlie Duke
inadvertently exposed the crew to German measles. Command Module (CM)
pilot, Ken Mattingly, turned out to have no immunity to measles and was
replaced by backup command module pilot Jack Swigert.
Launch - 13:13
Launch was at 13:13 C.S.T. on Saturday, April 11, 1970. At five and a
half minutes after liftoff, Swigert, Haise, and Lovell felt a little
vibration. Then the center engine of the S-II stage shut down two minutes
early. This caused the remaining four engines to burn 34 seconds longer
than planned, and the S-IVB third stage had to burn nine seconds longer to
put Apollo 13 in orbit.
Bored to Tears
The first two days the crew ran into a couple of minor surprises, but
generally Apollo 13 was looking like the smoothest flight of the program.
At 46 hours 43 minutes Joe Kerwin, the CapCom on duty, said, "The
spacecraft is in real good shape as far as we are concerned. We're bored
to tears down here." It was the last time anyone would mention
boredom for a long time.
At 55 hours 46 minutes, on April 13, as the crew finished a 49-minute
TV broadcast showing how comfortably they lived and worked in
weightlessness, Lovell stated: "This is the crew of Apollo 13 wishing
everybody there a nice evening, and we're just about ready to close out
our inspection of Aquarius (the LM) and get back for a pleasant evening in
Odyssey (the CM). Good night."
"Houston, We've Have a Problem!"
Nine minutes later, Oxygen tank No. 2 blew up, causing No. 1 tank also
to fail. The Apollo 13 command modules normal supply of electricity,
light, and water was lost, and they were about 200,000 miles from Earth.
The message came in the form of a sharp bang and vibration. Jack
Swigert saw a warning light that accompanied the bang, and said,
"Houston, we've had a problem here." (Hear this in RealMedia
G2 or Windows
Media format.) Lovell came on and told the ground that it was a main B
bus undervolt. The time was 2108 hours on April 13.
Next, the warning lights indicated the loss of two of Apollo 13's three
fuel cells, which were the spacecrafts prime source of electricity. With
warning lights blinking on, One Oxygen tank appeared to be completely
empty, and there were indications that the oxygen in the second tank was
rapidly being depleted.
Thirteen minutes after the explosion, Lovell happened to look out of
the left-hand window, and saw the final evidence pointing toward potential
catastrophe. "We are venting something out into the- into
space," he reported to Houston. Jack Lousma, the CapCom replied,
"Roger, we copy you venting." Lovell said, "It's a gas of
some sort." It was oxygen gas escaping at a high rate from the
second, and last, oxygen tank. (Read
the transcript here.)
The first thing the crew did, even before discovering the oxygen leak,
was to try to close the hatch between the CM and the LM. They reacted
spontaneously, like submarine crews, closing the hatches to limit the
amount of flooding. First Jack and then Lovell tried to lock the reluctant
hatch, but the stubborn lid wouldn't stay shut. Exasperated, and realizing
that there wasn't a cabin leak, they strapped the hatch to the CM couch.
The pressure in the No. 1 oxygen tank continued to drift downward;
passing 300 psi, now heading toward 200 psi. Months later, after the
accident investigation was complete, it was determined that, when No. 2
tank blew up, it either ruptured a line on the No. 1 tank, or caused one
of the valves to leak. When the pressure reached 200 psi, the crew and
ground controllers knew that they would lose all oxygen, which meant that
the last fuel cell would also die.
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The Mission Operations Control Room of the Mission
Control Center (MCC). Seated at consoles, from left to right, are
Donald K. Slayton, Jack R. Lousma, and John W. Young. Standing, left
to right, are Tom K. Mattingly and Vance D. Brand. |
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Ground Control Reaction
At 1 hour and 29 seconds after the bang, Jack Lousma, then CapCom, said
after instructions from Flight Director Glynn Lunney: "It is slowly
going to zero, and we are starting to think about the LM lifeboat."
Swigert replied, "That's what we have been thinking about too."
Ground controllers in Houston faced a formidable task. Completely new
procedures had to be written and tested in the simulator before being
passed up to the crew. The navigation problem had to be solved;
essentially how, when, and in what attitude to burn the LM descent engine
to provide a quick return home.
With only 15 minutes of power left in the CM, CapCom told the crew to
make their way into the LM. Fred and Jim Lovell quickly floated through
the tunnel, leaving Jack to perform the last chores in the Command Module.
The first concern was to determine if there were enough consumables to get
home? The LM was built for only a 45-hour lifetime, and it needed to be
stretch to 90. Oxygen wasn't a problem. The full LM descent tank alone
would suffice, and in addition, there were two ascent-engine oxygen tanks,
and two backpacks whose oxygen supply would never be used on the lunar
surface. Two emergency bottles on top of those packs had six or seven
pounds each in them. (At LM jettison, just before reentry, 28.5 pounds of
oxygen remained, more than half of what was available after the
explosion).
Power was also a concern. There were 2181 ampere hours in the LM
batteries, Ground controllers carefully worked out a procedure where the
CM batteries were charged with LM power. All non-critical systems were
turned off and energy consumption was reduced to a fifth of normal, which
resulted in having 20 percent of our LM electrical power left when
Aquarius was jettisoned. There was one electrical close call during the
mission. One of the CM batteries vented with such force that it
momentarily dropped off the line. Had the battery failed, there would be
insufficient power to return the ship to Earth.
Try the New Apollo Diet - Lose 30 Pounds!
Water was the main consumable concern. It was estimated that the crew
would run out of water about five hours before Earth reentry, which was
calculated at around 151 hours. However, data from Apollo 11 (which had
not sent its LM ascent stage crashing into the Moon as in subsequent
missions) showed that its mechanisms could survive seven or eight hours in
space without water cooling. The crew conserved water. They cut down to
six ounces each per day, a fifth of normal intake, and used fruit juices;
they ate hot dogs and other wet-pack foods when they ate at all. The crew
became dehydrated throughout the flight and set a record that stood up
throughout Apollo: Lovell lost fourteen pounds, and the crew lost a total
of 31.5 pounds, nearly 50 percent more than any other crew. Those
stringent measures resulted in the crew finishing with 28.2 pounds of
water, about 9 percent of the total.
Removal of Carbon Dioxide was also a concern. There were enough lithium
hydroxide canisters, which remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft, but
the square canisters from the Command Module were not compatible with the
round openings in the Lunar Module environmental system. There were four
cartridge from the LM, and four from the backpacks, counting backups.
However, the LM was designed to support two men for two days and was being
asked to care for three men nearly four days. After a day and a half in
the LM a warning light showed that the carbon dioxide had built up to a
dangerous level. Mission Control devised a way to attach the CM canisters
to the LM system by using plastic bags, cardboard, and tape- all materials
carried on board.
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Figure #1: The Apollo 13 Command Module splashed
down in the South Pacific at 12:07:44 p.m., April 17, 1970. In this
view the capsule has just hit the water and its parachutes are still
fully deployed. |
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Figure #2: Crewmen aboard the U.S.S. Iwo Jima,
prime recovery ship for the Apollo 13 mission, hoist the Command
Module aboard ship. The Apollo 13 crewmen were already aboard the
Iwo Jima when this photograph was taken. |
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Making It Home
One of the big questions was, "How to get back safely to
Earth?" The LM navigation system wasn't designed to help us in this
situation. Before the explosion, at 30 hours and 40 minutes, Apollo 13 had
made the normal midcourse correction, which would take it out of a
free-return-to-Earth trajectory and put it on a lunar landing course. Now
the task was to get back on a free-return course. The ground computed a
35-second burn and fired it 5 hours after the explosion. As they
approached the Moon, another burn was computed; this time a long 5-minute
burn to speed up the return home. It took place 2 hours after rounding the
far side of the Moon,
The Command Module navigational platform alignment was transferred to
the LM but verifying alignment was difficult. Ordinarily the alignment
procedure uses an onboard sextant device, called the Alignment Optical
Telescope, to find a suitable navigation star. Then with the help of the
onboard computer verify the guidance platform's alignment. However, due to
the explosion, a swarm of debris from the ruptured service module made it
impossible to sight real stars. An alternate procedure was developed to
use the sun as an alignment star. Lovell rotated the spacecraft to the
attitude Houston had requested and when he looked through the AOT, the Sun
was just where it was expected. The alignment with the Sun proved to be
less than a half a degree off. The ground and crew then knew they could do
the 5-minute P.C. + 2 burn with assurance, and that would cut the total
time of our voyage to about 142 hours. At 73:46 hours the air-to-ground
transcript describes the event:
Lovell: O.K. We got it. I think we got it. What
diameter was it?
Haise: Yes. It's coming back in. Just a second.
Lovell: Yes, yaw's coming back in. Just about it.
Haise: Yaw is in....
Lovell: What have you got?
Haise: Upper right corner of the Sun....
Lovell: We've got it!
If we raised our voices, I submit it was justified.
"I'm told the cheer of the year went up in Mission Control. Flight
Director Gerald Griffin, a man not easily shaken, recalls: "Some
years later I went back to the log and looked up that mission. My writing
was almost illegible I was so damned nervous. And I remember the
exhilaration running through me: My God, that's kinds the last hurdle --
if we can do that, I know we can make it. It was funny, because only the
people involved knew how important it was to have that platform properly
aligned." Yet Gerry Griffin barely mentioned the alignment in his
change-of-shift briefing -- "That check turned out real well" is
all he said an hour after his penmanship failed him.
The trip was marked by discomfort beyond the lack of food and water.
Sleep was almost impossible because of the cold. When the electrical
systems were turned off, the spacecraft lost and important source of heat.
The temperature dropped to 38 F and condensation formed on all the walls.
A most remarkable achievement of Mission Control was quickly developing
procedures for powering up the CM after its long cold sleep. Flight
controllers wrote the documents for this innovation in three days, instead
of the usual three months. The Command Module was cold and clammy at the
start of power up. The walls, ceiling, floor, wire harnesses, and panels
were all covered with droplets of water. It was suspected conditions were
the same behind the panels. The chances of short circuits caused
apprehension, but thanks to the safeguards built into the command module
after the disastrous Apollo-1 fire in January 1967, no arcing took place.
The droplets furnished one sensation as we decelerated in the atmosphere:
it rained inside the CM.
Landing
Four hours before landing, the crew shed the service module; Mission
Control had insisted on retaining it until then because everyone feared
what the cold of space might do to the unsheltered CM heat shield. Photos
of the Service Module showed one whole panel missing, and wreckage hanging
out, it was a sorry mess as it drifted away. Three hours later the crew
left the Lunar Module Aquarius and then splashed down gently in the
Pacific Ocean near Samoa.
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The astronauts, safely aboard the USS Iwo Jima make
calls home. |
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What Went Wrong?
After an intensive investigation, the Apollo 13 Accident Review Board
identified the cause of the explosion. In 1965 the CM had undergone many
improvements, which included raising the permissible voltage to the
heaters in the oxygen tanks from 28 to 65 volts DC. Unfortunately, the
thermostatic switches on these heaters weren't modified to suit the
change. During one final test on the launch pad, the heaters were on for a
long period of time. "This subjected the wiring in the vicinity of
the heaters to very high temperatures (1000 F), which have been
subsequently shown to severely degrade Teflon insulation. The thermostatic
switches started to open while powered by 65 volts DC and were probably
welded shut." Furthermore, other warning signs during testing went
unheeded and the tank, damaged from eight hours overheating, was a
potential bomb the next time it was filled with oxygen. That bomb exploded
on April 13, 1970 -- 200,000 miles from Earth.
*Portions from James A. Lovell, from Apollo Expeditions to the Moon,
edited by Edgar M. Cortright, NASA SP; 350, Washington, DC, 1975. |